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ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICES FOR THE POOR:
EXISTING PROGRAMS AND LIMITATIONS
MARCIA CYPEN*
Contending that rising health care costs have severely limited the
poor's access to hospitals, the author examines and discloses the
shortcomings of Medicare, Medicaid, the Hill-Burton Act, and
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Finding these to
be inadequate, the obligation to the poor under state tax exemp-
tions for "charitable" institutions is explored using Florida as a
model. The author finds that these, too, have not provided a
solution due to a lack of enforcement, ambiguity, and the absence
of defining regulations. The article concludes with recommended
changes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Aggravated by the spiralling cost of medical services in recent
years,' financial barriers to access to health care have become a
problem of serious magnitude.' These increased costs have directly
hindered the access of the poor' to the nation's mainstream hospital
* Former member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. During the third quarter of 1974, the annual price increase in the medical care compo-
nent of the Consumer Price Index was 18.6 percent, compared with 12.4 percent for the Index
generally. [Nov. 1974] CONSUMER PmCE INDEX DETAILED REPORT 9. More specifically, the cost
of an average hospital day has jumped from $16 in 1950 to $101 in 1973. Feldstein, The
Medical Economy, Soi. AM., Sept. 1973, at 154.
2. The concerns of many Americans about high costs and unequal accessibility to health
care services have resulted in growing pressure for federal intervention in the health care
industry to assure a basic right to uniform, minimum health care. This interest is reflected
in numerous legislative proposals in Congress in support of national health insurance. Ken-
nedy, Preface: Public Concern and Federal Intervention in the Health Care Industry, 70 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1 (1975).
3. The question of who the "poor" really are is a complex one, with no clear-cut answer.
Definitions vary with each governmental agency offering free services to the "poor." The
Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) Income Poverty Guidelines, 45 C.F.R. § 1060.2-4
(1975) define the "indigent" as follows:
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
system, and specifically to private, nonprofit hospitals. Outpatient
services for indigents, as well as free inpatient services, that were
3. (Cont.)








(These figures are for 1975.) Eligibility for free legal representation by Legal Services of
Greater Miami, Inc., is determined on the basis of 1973 OEO guidelines, 37 Fed. Reg. 26109
(1972):











Eligibility for free legal representation by the Public Defender's Office of Dade County,
Florida, is determined on the basis of "solvency" as defined by FLA. STAT. § 27.52 (1975):
(b) The following facts shall be prima facie evidence of solvency:
2. If the defendant has no dependents and his gross income exceeds $75 per
week; the income limit shall be increased by $10 per week for each of the first
two dependents of the defendant and by $5 per week for each dependent beyond
the first two . ...
In Florida, the eligibility criteria for uncompensated medical services pursuant to the Hill-
Burton Act (see section H, B infra) are based upon the following factors:
(1) The health and medical care insurance coverage, personal or family income,
size of the patient's family, and other financial obligations and resources of the
patient or the family in relation to the reasonable cost of the services shall be
considered in determining persons, otherwise self-supporting but unable to pay
the full charge.
(2) Office of Economic Opportunity Income Poverty Guidelines, which will be
the basis of uncompensated services for persons unable to pay.
The definition of "poor" for the purpose of providing free or below cost medical care
should be broad enough to include not only the "indigent," but the "medically indigent" as
well-those persons who are unable to pay the costs of necessary medical care, regardless of
whether they fall within the OEO income poverty guidelines. This definition is supported by
the Hill-Burton Act, which provides that the criteria for identifying persons unable to pay
for services "shall include persons who are otherwise self-supporting but unable to pay the
full charge for needed [medical] services." 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g)(1) (1975).
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HEALTH CARE
previously provided by these nonprofit hospitals have been largely
eliminated or reduced.4 This diminution in the delivery of health
care was specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County.5 Noting the "astronomical costs of
hospitalization which bear so heavily on the resources of most Amer-
icans," the Court observed that "It]he financial pressures under
which private nonprofit hospitals operate have already led many of
them to turn away patients who cannot pay or to severely limit the
number of indigents they will admit."6
Concomitant with the reduction of services supplied by private,
nonprofit hospitals, the public hospitals' (which are often the main
or sole health facilities open to the poor) have become overcrowded,
understaffed, underfinanced, and underequipped, and are conse-
quently inadequate to meet the demands of the poor.' As a result,
it is essential to examine other avenues of access to health care for
the poor and their effectiveness in closing this gap between the
supply and demand for services which has been created by rising
costs. Presently, there are several such avenues of access, including
Medicare, Medicaid, the Hill-Burton Act, and section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code. The first part of this article will explore
these approaches and their inadequacies in meeting this need for
health care. The second part will focus on Florida's tax exemption
statutes for "charitable" institutions, and the cases interpreting
them, as the source of a specific obligation of Florida's private non-
profit hospitals to provide health care services to "those unable to
pay.")
II. APPROACHES TO CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN SUPPLY AND DEMAND
IN HEALTH CARE
A. Medicare and Medicaid
In response to the health care crisis, the federal government
4. See Rose, The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health Problems of
the Poor, 21 CATH. UL. REV. 35 (1971); Schwartz & Rose, Opening the Doors of the Non-
profit Hospital to the Poor, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 655 (1974).
5. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
6. Id. at 265.
7. "Public" hospitals are those hospitals directly supported by state and county funds
and administered by the state or county.
8. See authorities cited in note 4 supra.
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adopted Medicare9 and Medicaid'" in 1965. Although these pro-
grams meet the health needs of the poor to some degree, they have
been inadequate to fully ameliorate the situation:
Whereas the "mainstream" of health care during the 1950s and
early 1960s was progressive and represented by research-oriented
medical centers, public hospitals became the "dumping ground"
for the medically indigent and had come to be identified with a
dual standard of health care delivery. The passage of Medicare
and Medicaid legislation in the mid-1960s was expected to unify
the dual system. Unfortunately the private sector has not ab-
sorbed its proportionate share of the sick poor. 1
Moreover, there are many gaps in the coverage of the federal
programs. The primary limitation of the Medicare program" is that
it principally covers persons over age 65.11 Additional limitations are
imposed in the form of: (1) a maximum number of days covered by
Medicare per "spell of illness"; 4 (2) cost-sharing devices such as
deductibles, co-insurance, and premiums which shift a portion of
the burden of payment to the Medicare recipient; 5 and (3) numer-
ous exclusions from coverage.'
The effectiveness of the Medicaid program" is significantly lim-
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (1970).
10. Id. §§ 1396 et seq.
11. HOSPITALS, July 1, 1970, at 54. HOSPITALS is the official publication of the American
Hospital Association.
12. For a full discussion of Medicare see Butler, An Advocate's Guide to the Medicare
Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 831 (1975).
13. Also covered are those persons under age 65 who have been entitled to old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance benefits under Title H of the Social Security Act for 24
consecutive months or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(c) (Supp. V, 1975). In addition, a special
exception has been made for persons under age 65 who are either fully or currently insured
under Social Security, and who are medically determined to have chronic renal disease and
require hemodialysis or renal transplantation for such disease. 42 U.S.C. § 414(b) (1970); id.
§ 426(e) (Supp. V, 1975).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1970).
15. Id. § 1395e.
16. See id. 1395y(a). Exclusions include expenses incurred for: (1) routine physical
checkups; (2) eyeglasses or eye examinations for the purpose of prescribing, fitting, or chang-
ing eyeglasses; (3) hearing aids or examinations therefor; (4) immunizations; (5) custodial
care; (6) the care, treatment, filling, removal, or replacement of teeth or structures directly
supporting teeth; (7) treatment of flat foot conditions; and (8) personal comfort items. A
broad exclusion is for expenses for services "which are not reasonable and necessary for the
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning of a malformed body
member." Id. § 1395y(a)(1).
17. For a full discussion of Medicaid see Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statu-
tory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7 (1974).
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ited since the only persons to whom participating states are statuto-
rily compelled to provide services are the "categorically needy. '"'
This group includes recipients of benefits under the state's plan for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)"5 and recipients
of Supplemental Security Income benefits (SSI).20 Restrictive eligi-
bility requirements"' for these programs therefore severely limit the
class of persons able to benefit from the Medicaid program. For
example, single persons and intact family units are ineligible for
AFDC in Florida and are thus excluded from Medicaid coverage
despite their poverty (unless eligible for SSI). In fact, nationwide
only 59 percent of those individuals defined as "poor" by the United
States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) re-
ceive Medicaid coverage. 2 Furthermore, many states, including
Florida, have chosen not to participate in the optional Medicaid
18. "Categorically needy" individuals include those who qualify as recipients under a
state plan falling within 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1970) and those who are mandatorily
eligible for Medicaid assistance. See Butler, supra note 17, at 8-9.
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
20. See id. §§ 1381 et seq.
21. AFDC in Florida is available to families with dependent children under age 18 and
an absent or disabled parent whose income (after certain deductions) is less than the following
need standards:







(Add $30 for each additional person over 6.)
STATE OF FLORIDA ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS MANUAL, Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, Social and Economic Services Program (SES).
Medicaid is also available to children of ages 18-21 who would be otherwise eligible for
AFDC but for their age, as well as to foster children in the custody of SES. In January 1976,
244,009 persons received AFDC payments in the State of Florida. SSI is available pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (1970) to those persons who are either blind, over 65, or permanently
and totally disabled, and whose income and resources are within the guidelines set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (Supp. V, 1975). To be within these latter statutory guidelines, an
individual must have: (1) an income less than $1752 per year if without an eligible spouse,
and resources less than $2250 if living with a spouse or $1500 if not living with a spouse; and
(2) an income less than $2628 per year if with an eligible spouse, and resources less than $2250
(these figures are combined income and resources of both the individual and spouse).
22. In Florida, only 27 percent of those persons defined as "poor" by HEW receive
Medicaid coverage. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SUBCOMM. ON
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, DATA ON THE MEDICAID PROGRAM: ELIGIBILITY, SERVICES, Ex-
PENDITURES FISCAL YEARS 1966-76 43 (Jan. 1976).
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
program which provides benefits for the "categorically related medi-
cally needy." 3
Satisfaction of the health care needs of the poor through the
Medicaid program is limited further by its scope of coverage. 4 Addi-
tionally, the states have the discretion to limit the amount, dura-
tion, and scope of all services provided under the Medicaid program,
as long as the services covered are sufficient to "reasonably achieve
their purpose. '"25 On its face, this standard is difficult to apply. In
practice it means that the state's discretion has no defined limits.
As yet, there have been no cases in which a court has examined the
adequacy of amount, scope, or duration of Medicaid services. 6
As the costs of Medicaid have become increasingly burdensome
upon the states in recent years, 7 many states, and especially Flor-
ida, have exercised their discretion to limit the amount, duration,
and scope of services by effecting "cutbacks" which further limit the
already restricted availability of medical services to Medicaid recip-
ients. Such "cutbacks" include: limiting or eliminating optional
services; restricting the amount or duration of mandatory services;
imposing burdensome prior authorization procedures to discourage
treatment; freezing or reducing provider reimbursement levels;
imposing cost-sharing obligations; and restricting eligibility.28
23. The "categorically related medically needy" are persons who otherwise meet the
AFDC or SSI eligibility standards, but whose income or resources are slightly greater than
that allowed by the eligibility criteria. Such persons are considered eligible for Medicaid if
their income, reduced by their medical expenses, falls below the "medically needy" eligibility
level set by the state. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C) (Supp. V, 1975). Congress has set the
maximum medically needy income level at 133 1/3 percent of the AFDC payment level. 42
U.S.C. § 1396b(f)(1)(B)(i) (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) (1970). Mandatory services which the state must provide
are listed in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(1).(5) (1970), as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). Optional
services which the state is not required to provide are listed in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(6)-(16),
as amended, (Supp. V, 1975). The optional services include private nursing services, clinical
services, dental services, physical therapy, drugs, intermediate care facility services, mental
hospital services for persons over 65, prosthetic devices, eyeglasses, and hearing aids.
25. 45 C.F.R. § 249.10(a)(5) (1975).
26. Two cases have been settled: Carr v. Bonin, No. 72-2738 (E.D. La., May 5, 1972);
Powers v. Lackey, Clearinghouse No. 8906 (N.D. Ga.).
27. Medicaid costs increased from under $2 billion in 1965 to over $10 billion in 1975.
Although this increase is mainly attributable to inflation in the costs of services, the states
have chosen to reduce the number of eligible recipients and to impede access to services,
rather than to attempt to control the costs of the services. Mullen & Fredenburg, Coping with
Medicaid Cutbacks, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 392 (1975).
28. Florida's "cutbacks" include: (1) reduction of the maximum amount of covered
inpatient hospitalization care from 45 to 30 days per year, with no hospitalization for surgery
[Vol. 31:127
HEALTH CARE
Finally, the unavailability and inaccessibility of Medicaid
providers (particularly physicians) represent severe problem for
Medicaid recipients. Low reimburnement rates and burdensome
administrative procedures are prime factors in deterring provider
participation."5
B. The Hill-Burton Act
Due to the inadequacies of the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams, alternate routes have been utilized to provide health care
services to the poor. One such avenue is the enforcement of the legal
obligations of the hospital-grantees of federal construction money
under the Hill-Burton Act.3 0 Under this Act, federal construction
money is given to nonprofit hospitals in exchange for their assurance
that:
(1) the facility or portion thereof to be constructed or modern-
ized will be made available to all persons residing in the terri-
torial area . . . [the "community service" obligation]; and (2)
there will be made available in the facility or portion thereof to
be constructed or modernized a reasonable volume of services to
persons unable to pay therefore . . . [the "free service" obliga-
tion] .3
Although these obligations remained ignored and unenforced for
almost 25 years, recently the Act and its obligations have been
revitalized through a series of lawsuits." Thus, in Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hospital33 the obligation to participate in the Medicaid
program has been construed to be included in the "community serv-
ice" obligation of the Hill-Burton grantees:
which can be "safely" postponed; (2) reduction of outpatient hospitalization care from $200
to $50 per year; (3) reduction in physician fees; (4) elimination of dental care for adults; (5)
limitation on dental care under the EPSDT screening program for children under 18 to only
"essential" dental care, and a maximum of $125 for such care per year; (6) elimination of
optometric services; (7) elimination of prosthetic devices, including eyeglasses, hearing aids,
dentures, and artificial limbs; and (8) maximum of $20 per month for prescription drugs, with
burdensome administrative procedures if a greater amount is required.
29. See Butler, supra note 17.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (1970); 42 C.F.R. §§ 53.111, .113 (1975).
31. Id. § 291c(e)(1).
32. For a full discussion of the history of the Hill-Burton Act and its revitalization see
Rose, Federal Regulation of Services to the Poor Under the Hill-Burton Act: Realities and
Pitfalls, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 168 (1975).
33. 61 F.R.D. 354 (E.D. La. 1972).
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The exclusion of persons covered by the Medicaid Program...
constitutes a denial of service to persons in the territorial area,
and consequently a violation of the "community service" obliga-
tion of the defendant hospitals."
In response to this ruling, HEW promulgated regulations man-
dating participation in the Medicaid program by all Hill-Burton
hospitals:3
5
In order to comply with its community service assurance an ap-
plicant must:
(2)(i) Make arrangements, if eligible to do so, for reimburse-
ment for services with: . . . (B) Those Federal governmental
third-party programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, to the
extent that the applicant is entitled to reimbursement at reason-
able cost ....
A 20-year limitation for mandatory Medicaid participation was
added by HEW,3" but the Cook court invalidated that provision in
subsequent litigation. 7
The enforcement of the "community service" obligation of Hill-
Burton grantees to participate in the Medicaid program would
greatly increase the number of Medicaid provider hospitals in the
private sector, and thereby increase the access of the poor to that
sector. As non-compliance is currently widespread,3" such
enforcement would facilitate this desired result.
HEW also has established presumptive compliance guidelines
for fulfillment of the "free service" obligation:"
An applicant which, for a fiscal year, (1) budgets for the support
of, and makes available on request, uncompensated services at a
level not less than the lesser of 3 percent of operating costs or 10
percent of all Federal assistance provided to or on behalf of the
applicant under the Act, or (2) certifies that it will not exclude
any person from admission on the ground that such person is
unable to pay for needed services and that it will make available
to each person so admitted services provided by the facility with-
34. Id. at 361.
35. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(d)(2) (1975).
36. 42 C.F.R. § 53.113(a) (1975).
37. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp., (unreported opinion) (E.D. La., March 12, 1975).
38. See note 46 infra and accompanying text.
39. This obligation is limited to 20 years from the opening of the facility or the portion
thereof receiving the grant. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(a) (1975).
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out charge or at a charge below reasonable cost which does not
exceed any such person's ability to pay therefore ...shall be
deemed in presumptive compliance with its assurance.'0
These guidelines have been criticized as unfair to poor people and
inconsistent with the underlying policy of the Act.4' Initially, it may
be noted that these guidelines (which are inordinately low) were set
as a maximum by HEW. Thus, a state's Hill-Burton agency may
not require that a larger volume of free care be provided by any
hospital, although it may have the financial ability to do so.4' Fur-
thermore, the hospital grantee may choose freely from among the
presumptive compliance options, without regard to equity. As a
result, a hospital which is financially able to elect the "open door"
option (whereby no one would be turned away from admission for
financial reasons) may legally choose one of the significantly less
demanding options.
In computing the amount of free service provided, the court in
Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center43 held that bad debts are not
to be included:
[Tihe only services for which the statutory assurance is received
are those provided to persons who are "unable", not merely un-
willing to pay. Bad debts incurred by the hospitals from persons
not covered by the statute are an expense of operating which they
must bear themselves."
HEW acquiesced in this court decision by issuing a policy memo-
randum 5 requiring determination of eligibility for free care prior to
the rendition of services. This requirement necessarily precludes the
inclusion of bad debts as free care because persons determined to
be eligible therefore cannot be billed, except for "informational"
purposes.
The "prior determination" requirement has additional signifi-
cance for the poor. Most hospitals require preadmission deposits,
which act as an effective barrier to the admission of indigents who
usually do not have adequate funds for such deposits. Enforced
40. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(d) (1975).
41. Rose, The Hill-Burton Act-The Interim Regulation and Service to the Poor: A
Study in Public Interest Litigation, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 309 (1972).
42. See id. at 312-13.
43. 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
44. Id. at 557.
45. 40 Fed. Reg. 10686 (1975).
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compliance with the "prior determination" requirement by Hill-
Burton grantees would eliminate the preadmission deposit requisite
for those persons qualifying for free care. Thus, access of the poor
to private hospitals would be increased.
The existence of these unequivocal obligations of Hill-Burton
grantees would seem to make the Hill-Burton Act a potentially
powerful tool for the poor in gaining access to health care services.
In reality, however, the Hill-Burton Act has not been effective and
has not served the poor in the manner in which it was intended. A
1972 American Hospital Association survey of approximately 187
nonprofit Hill-Burton hospitals taken at the request of HEW dem-
onstrated that approximately 70 percent of the facilities had not
met the presumptive compliance guidelines at that time.46
The effectiveness of the Act has been severely limited by several
factors: (1) the existing hospital system whereby patients are nor-
mally admitted only upon the orders of private physicians, to whom
the poor are unlikely to have access; (2) interpretations of the regu-
lations which constrict the amount of services rendered to the poor
under the Act; (3) lack of enforcement by state Hill-Burton agencies
which are charged with this responsibility;47 (4) inadequate notice
to the poor of the availability of free services, and no affirmative
outreach efforts by the hospitals; and (5) HEW's refusal to effec-
tively administer the Act.48
Accordingly, the Hill-Burton Act remains an unfulfilled prom-
ise of health care for the poor. The National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 197411 may have an ameliorative ef-
fect. This law was enacted with the objective of strengthening
health regulatory and area planning programs, including Hill-
Burton, and shifts many enforcement responsibilities to the federal
government." However, as final regulations implementing the new
enforcement scheme are not scheduled for publication until June 2,
1976-11/2 years after the signing of the Act-no immediate changes
in Hill-Burton are forthcoming."
46. See Comment, Provision of Free Medical Services by Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HARV.
Cv. RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 351, 352 (1973).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 291d (1970).
48. Rose, supra note 32, at 194-200.
49. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k et seq. (Supp. V, 1975). For a full discussion of the Act see
Schneider & Wing, The National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974:
Implications for the Poor, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 683 (1976).




C. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code
An alternate, and perhaps more viable, avenue of access for the
poor to private, nonprofit hospitals is through the enforcement of
the hospitals' obligations arising pursuant to their tax exempt
status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code."2 Hos-
pitals as a class have never been expressly categorized as tax exempt
organizations. They have achieved such status only by qualifying as
"charitable" organizations under section 501(c)(3). Section 501
provides in part:
(a) Exemption from Taxation-An organization described in
subsection (c) . . . shall be exempt from taxation under this
subtitle ....
(c)(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or founda-
tion, organized and operated exclusively for. . . charitable...
purposes . . . no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual . . ..
In addition, contributions to such tax-exempt charitable organiza-
tions are deductible for purposes of computing federal income tax"
and estate and gift taxes.55
Tax exempt status under section 501(c)(3) is, therefore, finan-
cially advantageous to hospitals. Not only are the hospitals' tax
dollars saved, but philanthropy is also encouraged because of the
tax deductions available to contributors, thus generating additional
revenues for the hospitals. The question which logically follows is
what is the quid pro quo for such status-what obligations are im-
posed upon section 501(c)(3) hospitals in order to compensate the
federal government for the tax dollars lost as a result of the hospi-
tals' tax exempt status?
On its face, section 501(c)(3) gives no definition of "chari-
table" purposes. This has been left both to the courts and to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who has the authority to pro-
mulgate rules and regulations necessary to implement the statute.5"
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). For a full discussion of § 501(c)(3) see Rose,
The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health Problems of the Poor, 21 CATH.
U.L. REV. 35 (1971).
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 501(a), (c)(3).
54. Id. §§ 170(a)-(c).
55. Id. §§ 2055(a)(2), 2106(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2522 (a)(2).
56. Id. § 7805(a).
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The Commissioner's rulings set forth the official policy of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) and are designed to guide taxpayers, the
interested public, and IRS officials in tax matters. 7
The long-standing judicial interpretation of the application of
"charitable" to hospitals under the Internal Revenue Code required
that they serve persons unable to pay.5" This position was "codified"
by the IRS in 1956 by Revenue Ruling 56-185, which specifically
required that a qualifying hospital:
Must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those
not able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for
those who are able and expected to pay. It is normal for hospitals
to charge those able to pay for services rendered in order to meet
the operating expenses of the institution, without denying medi-
cal care or treatment to others unable to pay . . . . It must not,
however, refuse to accept patients in need of hospital care who
cannot pay for such services. Furthermore, if it operates with the
expectation of full payment from all those to whom it renders
services, it does not dispense charity merely because some of its
patients fail to pay for the services rendered.
In 1969, the IRS revised its long-standing position and issued
Revenue Ruling 69-545, which provides that a hospital will qualify
as exempt under section 501(c)(3):
By operating an emergency room open to all persons and by pro-
viding hospital care for all those persons in the community able
to pay the cost thereof either directly or through third party reim-
bursement .... 10
Relying on the law of charitable trusts,6 the revenue ruling further
acknowledged that providing hospital care on a nonprofit basis for
57. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Shultz, 370 F. Supp. 325, 327 & n.10
(D.D.C. 1973), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 975 (1975), citing Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations,
Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 757, 763 (1965).
58. Commissioner v. Battle Creek, Inc., 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942); Intercity Hosp.
Ass'n v. Squire, 56 F. Supp. 472 (W.D. Wash. 1944); Sonora Community Hosp., 46 T.C. 519
(1966); Lorain Ave. Clinic, 31 T.C. 141 (1958); Cranley, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 20 (1961);
Davis Hosp., Inc., 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 312 (1945); Goldsby King Memorial Hosp., 3 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 693 (1944). See also Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 805
(S.D. Ohio 1973); Olney, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1958); Bromberg, The Charitable Hos-
pital, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 237 (1970).
59. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 202 (emphasis added).
60. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 117.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 368, comment (b), § 372, comments (b)-(c) (1957);
4 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, §§ 368, 372.2 (3d ed. 1967).
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members of the community is a "charitable" purpose in the legal
sense of the term, stating:
The promotion of health. . . is one of the purposes in the general
law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the community as a
whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a
direct benefit from its activities does not include all members of
the community, such as indigent members of the community,
provided that the class is not so small that its relief is not of
benefit to the community.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 thus removes the prior obligation of
hospitals to provide free services to those unable to pay in order to
qualify as "charitable": "Revenue Ruling 56-185 is hereby modified
to remove therefrom the requirements relating to caring for patients
without charge or at rates below cost." The poor are not totally
ignored, however, as a hospital seeking exemption under section
501(c)(3) is obligated to participate in Medicare and Medicaid, and
also to operate an emergency room open to all persons regardless of
their ability to pay for services. Thus, the effect of Revenue Ruling
69-545 is to limit the access of the poor to free care by section
501(c)(3) hospitals to three routes-Medicare, Medicaid, and emer-
gency room services. The wisdom of the health policy of the current
revenue ruling is questionable since it enlarges the already existing
gulf between health care services available to the rich and those
available to the poor.2
The validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545 was challenged in
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon83 on two
grounds: (1) that the ruling was an ultra vires action by the Com-
missioner, as it "legislated" a critical change in tax policy without
appropriate authority; and (2) that even if not ultra vires, the re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act 4 were illegally cir-
cumvented. Not reaching the second ground, the court held, inter
alia, that the sweeping policy change embodied in Revenue Ruling
69-545 was unjustified and without support in relevant judicial,
legislative, or administrative history, and that reliance on the prin-
ciples of trust law was misplaced. The court stated:
62. Rose, The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health Problems of the
Poor, 21 CATH. UL. REv. 35 (1971).
63. 370 F. Supp. 325, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1973), rev 'd, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1970).
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[Rievenue Ruling 69-545 was improperly promulgated and is
without effect inasmuch as it allows private nonprofit hospitals
to qualify as charities under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
without requiring the hospitals to offer special financial consider-
ation to persons unable to pay."
On appeal, the district court ruling was reversed."6 The appel-
late court concluded that Revenue Ruling 69-545 with its broad
interpretation of "charitable" was not inconsistent with section
501(c)(3) and that modification of the prior ruling was authorized:
While it is true that in the past Congress and the federal courts
have conditioned a hospital's charitable status on the level of free
or below cost care that it provided for indigents, there is no au-
thority for the conclusion that the determination of "charitable"
status was always to be so limited .... 11
Thus, the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545 was upheld.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the
district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that the Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization
had failed to establish standing."8 Thus, Revenue Ruling 69-545
remains in effect, and the obligations imposed upon hospitals with
section 501(c)(3) status are limited to participation in Medicare and
Medicaid and the operation of an emergency room open to all per-
sons regardless of their ability to pay for services."
III. FLORIDA'S TAX EXEMPTION STATUTES
In light of the insufficiencies of Medicare and Medicaid, the
lack of enforcement and ineffectiveness of the Hill-Burton Act, and
limited obligations imposed by section 501(c)(3) status, other ave-
nues of access to health care services for the poor must be explored.
Specifically, the obligation to serve the poor arising under state
laws granting tax exemptions to "charitable" institutions merits
attention. An examination of Florida law will serve as a model.
65. 370 F. Supp. at 338.
66. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. Id. at 1287-88.
68. 44 U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
69. This decision has a significant impact upon the duty of nonprofit charitable hospitals
in Florida to provide free services to the poor, as § 501(c)(3) is intertwined with several of
Florida's tax exemption statutes.
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Florida law does not exempt hospitals ' " from taxation per se. As
under federal law, tax exempt status may be obtained by hospitals
only through qualification as nonprofit, charitable institutions. The
criteria for determination of "nonprofit" status and "charitable"
status are different, and the question of whether or not a hospital is
a charitable institution requires close analysis.
The Florida Constitution' authorizes tax exemption for prop-
erty to the extent that it is used predominantly for charitable pur-
poses." No definition of "charitable purposes" is given. The legisla-
ture is vested with the power to enact general laws providing tax
exemption, 3 and to set forth criteria which must be met in order to
qualify for the exemption.74 Thus, in effect, the legislature has the
power to define "charitable purposes."
The power of the legislature is limited, however, since the legis-
lative definition of charitable must bear a "reasonable relationship
. . .[to] . . .the specifically described exemption and one of the
purposes which the Constitution requires to be served." Accord-
ingly, the legislature has enacted several statutes providing tax ex-
emption for property used for charitable purposes, including exemp-
tions from the real and personal property tax,7" intangible personal
property tax,77 corporate income tax," unemployment compensation
70. A "hospital" is defined by FLA. STAT. § 196.012(7) (1975) as an institution which
possesses a valid license granted under Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, on January 1 of the
year for which exemption from ad valorem taxation is requested. This is the only tax exemp-
tion statute defining "hospital."
71. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (1968) provides that: "Such portions of property as are
used predominantly for ... charitable purposes may be exempted by general law from
taxation."
72. The 1885 Florida Constitution contained two separate provisions (with separate cri-
teria) authorizing exemption from taxation for property used for charitable purposes. This
created considerable confusion. For an historical background of these two provisions see Note,
The "Public Purpose" and "Charitable" Tax Exemption in Florida: A Judicial Morass, 19
U. FLA. L. REV. 330 (1966). Article VII, § 3(a) of the 1968 Constitution consolidates the two
provisions of the former constitution, with significant changes in language. For an analysis
of the new provision see Note, Property Tax Exemptions under Article VII, Section 3(a) of
the Florida Constitution of 1968, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 641 (1969).
73. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (1968).
74. See FLA. STAT. § 196.196(1)(a)-(b) (1975) for the criteria for qualifying for the charita-
ble purpose exemption.
75. Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1968); accord, Presbyterian
Homes of the Synod v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556, 558 (Fla. 1974); Lummus v. Florida Adirondack
School, 168 So. 232 (Fla. 1936).
76. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(1) (1975).
77. Id. § 199.031.
78. Id. § 220.13(6)(h).
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law,79 sales and use tax, " occupational license tax,8' and charitable
funds act registration fee.8" Pursuant to Florida Statutes section
196.012(1) (1975), property which is used predominantly 3 or exclu-
sively,4 for a charitable purpose is exempt from Florida's real and
personal property (ad valorem) tax. An additional requirement
under section 109.195 (4) of thp Florida Statutes (1975) is the non-
profit status of the applicant property owner. 85
"Charitable purpose" is defined in Florida Statutes section
196.012(6) (1975) as: [A] function or service which is of such a
community service that its discontinuance could result in the allo-
cation of public funds for the continuance of the function or service.
This definition is extremely broad and vague, and if taken literally
could reasonably apply to almost every function or service. The
definition is refined when read in conjunction with section
196.196(1)(b), which provides:
In the determination of whether an applicant is actually using all
or a portion of its property predominantly for a charitable...
purpose, the following criteria shall be applied: . . . the extent
to which services are provided to persons at a charge that is equal
to or less than the cost of providing such services."6
This focus on the charge for services indicates a legislative policy to
promote, through the granting of charitable tax-exempt status, the
provision of services to persons unable to pay all or a portion of the
cost of such services.
Furthermore, in determining the extent of tax exemption to be
granted specifically to a hospital, section 196.197(7) provides that:
[P]roperty used for the treatment of private outpatients shall
not be deemed to be serving an exempt purpose and shall not be
exempt from taxation. Hospital emergency rooms, hospital clini-
79. Id. § 443.03(5)(1)(9).
80. Id. § 212.08(7)(a).
81. Id. §§ 205.022(7), .192.
82. Id. § 496.04.
83. "Predominant use of property" means property used for exempt purposes in excess
of 50 percent but less than exclusive. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(3) (1975).
84. "Exclusive use of property" means property used 100 percent for exempt purposes.
FLA. STAT. § 196.012(2) (1975).
85. The criteria for determining nonprofit status are contained in FLA. STAT. § 196.195(2)
(1975), including "[tihe reasonableness of charges made by the applicant for any services
rendered by it in relation to the value of those services. .. .
86. FLA. STAT. § 196.196(1)(b) (1975).
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cal facilities, and other hospital property or facilities which are
leased to a nonprofit corporation which provides direct services
to patients in a nonprofit or public hospital. . . are excluded and
shall be exempt from taxation."7
The distinction drawn between "the treatment of private outpa-
tients" and the provision of "direct services to patients in a
nonprofit or public hospital" places further emphasis upon a hospi-
tal's provision of services to persons unable to pay for such services
as a focal point in determining whether or not a charitable purpose
is served. The implication of the language is that a private hospital
serving only private, paying patients is not a charitable institution
without more. Thus, a hospital does not per se serve a charitable
purpose."
Alternatively, a hospital will receive an exemption from ad va-
lorem taxation under Florida Statutes section 196.197(6) (1975) if
it is a nonprofit Florida corporation which is exempt from federal
income taxation under the provisions of section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code. 9 This alternate route to tax exemption is
significant, as it obviates the necessity of meeting the definition of
''charitable" under the Florida statute (other than the requirement
of nonprofit status), and instead shifts the focus of the inquiry to
the definition of "charitable" under the Internal Revenue Code.'"
87. Id. § 196.197(7).
88. This interpretation is supported by Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc.,
173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965). See note 129 infra and accompanying text.
89. See notes 52-55 supra and accompanying text. Note that an organization exempt
under § 501(c) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 does not meet the criteria of FLA. STAT.
§ 196.197(6). Op. Arr'y GEN. 072-253 (Aug. 9, 1972). Section 501(c)(4) provides exemption
for:
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for
the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the member-
ship of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a
particular municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to
charitable . . . purposes.
90. The ad valorem tax exemption statute refers only to the Internal Revenue Code
provision. It is not specifically stated whether or not the legislature intended to incorporate
the Revenue Rulings of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or judicial interpretations of
such rulings into the statute. However, as Revenue Rulings are necessary to implement the
Internal Revenue Code provision and, in addition, represent the official policy of the Internal
Revenue Service (See note 57 supra and accompanying text), the implication is that all
Revenue Rulings were intended to be incorporated. Otherwise the statute can have no mean-
ing. It follows that judicial interpretations of Revenue Rulings are also incorporated, thus
giving added significance to the Supreme Court's ruling in the Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Org. case.
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Thus, a hospital seeking exemption from ad valorem taxation is
relieved of the obligation to provide free or below cost services if it
is exempt under section 501(c)(3).
It is interesting to note that exemption from ad valorem taxa-
tion was denied to a home for the aged in Haines v. St. Petersburg
Methodist Home, Inc."1 despite tax exempt status under section
501(c)(3). The applicable Florida statute in effect, section 192.06(3)
(1961), provided exemption from ad valorem taxation for:
Such property of . . . charitable . . . institutions within this
state, as shall actually be occupied and used by them for the
purpose for which they have been or may be organized . . . pro-
vided, further, that the above stated limitation against the rental
of more than seventy-five per cent of the floor space of any such
building or property shall not apply to rooms or beds rented...
to patients in any hospital. . . which has been exempt from the
payment of taxes to the United States upon the income derived
from the operation of such hospital .... 11
In rejecting section 501(c)(3) status as a basis for exemption
from Florida ad valorem taxation, the court distinguished the focus
of tax exemption, under section 501(c)(3) from that of the ad valo-
rem tax exemption, and stated:
Under the Federal Internal Revenue Code, income tax exemption
does not depend so much upon how the applicant makes its
money or how it uses its property as upon how it is currently
spending the money it makes . . . . It cannot be emphasized too
strongly that a dedicated charitable use of the property, with
availability to the public, is a condition to property tax immunity
on this ground. A minor or incidental use for charitable purposes
is not enough. 3
Note that § 501.204(2) of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Law specifi-
cally states:
[D]ue consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the
Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to S. 5(a)(1) of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. ...
Such a provision in the Florida ad valorem tax exemption statute would eliminate the neces-
sity of making an "implication" as to the incorporation of Revenue Rulings and judicial
interpretations.
91. 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
92. FLA. STAT. § 192.06(3) (1965), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 192.06(3) (1975) (emphasis
added).
93. 173 So. 2d at 183 (citations omitted).
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Emphasizing the lack of charity cases in the home for the aged, the
court denied an ad valorem tax exemption.
The statute was amended, effective January 1, 1966, to treat
homes for the aged similarly to hospitals by precluding the applica-
tion of the 75 percent rental limitation to homes for the aged as well.
The legislature thus ignored the Haines court's interpretation of the
relationship between section 501(c)(3) status and ad valorem tax
exemption for charitable institutions.
Pursuant to Florida Statutes section 199.072(2)(a) (1975), in-
tangible personal property owned by nonprofit charitable institu-
tions is exempt from Florida's Intangible Personal Property Tax.
Section 199.072(2)(b)(3)94 provides:
"Charitable institutions" shall mean only nonprofit corporations
operating physical facilities in Florida at which are provided
charitable services, a reasonable percentage of which shall be
without cost to those unable to pay, and those institutions quali-
fied as charitable under Section 501(c)(3), United States Internal
Revenue Code, 1954.
The requirement that a reasonable percentage of services be
provided "without cost to those unable to pay" indicates a
legislative concern for the provision of free services to the poor.
Moreover, the statute specifically requires that the exemption pro-
vision containing the definition of "charitable institutions" shall be
strictly defined, limited, and applied. 5 However, "reasonable per-
centage" is nowhere defined, either by statute or administrative
regulation.
The statute recognizes "those institutions qualified as charita-
ble under section 501(c)(3)" of the Internal Revenue Code as "chari-
table institutions." The legislative intent here is ambiguous due to
the use of the word "and." If section 501(c)(3) status is an alternate
route to exemption, independent of the other requirements of Flor-
ida Statutes section 199.072(2)(b)(3) (1975), then a hospital seeking
exemption is freed of the obligation to provide a reasonable percen-
tage of free services to "those unable to pay" if it is exempt under
section 501(c)(3). A second possible interpretation is that the re-
94. This statute was enacted July 1, 1971, prior to the enactment on December 31,
1971, of FLA. STAT. § 196.012(6) (1975), which contains the broad definition of "charitable
purposes" for purposes of the ad valorem tax exemption. The later enactment does not appear
to undermine the earlier enactment.
95. FLA. STAT. § 199.072 (1975).
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quirement of provision of free services applies to section 501(c)(3)
institutions as well.
The more reasonable interpretation appears to be that qualifi-
cation as a charitable institution under section 501(c)(3) is an alter-
nate route to exemption, especially in light of the exemption from
ad valorem taxation for section 501(c)(3) corporations. As such, the
definition of "charitable" under section 501(c)(3) is controlling for
purposes of exemption from the intangible personal property tax.
Pursuant to section 220.13(2)(h) of the Florida Statutes, all
income of a section 501(c)(3) corporation, except unrealized busi-
ness taxable income, is exempt from Florida's corporate income tax.
No definition of "charitable" is given within the statute itself-sole
reliance is placed upon the definition of "charitable" under section
501(c)(3). Again, this Florida tax incorporates by reference the fed-
eral income tax standard for charitable exemption. Reliance upon
the definition of "charitable" under federal income tax law appears
reasonable in this context, as it is likely that the rationale for ex-
emption from state income tax is analagous to that of exemption
from federal income tax.
Florida Statutes section 443.03(5)(1)(9) (1975) provides that
organizations organized and operated exclusively for "charitable
purposes" are exempt from Florida's unemployment compensation
law if "no part of the net earnings . . . inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." No definition of "charitable pur-
pose" is given. Organizations exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code are also exempt from Florida's unemploy-
ment compensation law pursuant to Florida Statutes section
443.03(5)(1)(11.a.) (1975). This section incorporates by reference the
definition of "charitable" under the Internal Revenue Code. It
would appear that the former exemption is for non-corporations and
the latter for corporations. 6
Exemptions from the Florida sales, use, and other transactions
tax, and the Florida occupational license tax are granted to charita-
ble institutions, pursuant to sections 212.08(7)(a) and 205.022(7) of
96. The exemption does not apply, however, to charitable organizations with § 501(c)(3)
status which had:
[flour or more individuals in employment for some portion of a day in each of
20 different weeks, whether or not such weeks were consecutive, within either the
current or preceding calendar year, regardless of whether they were employed at
the same moment of time. FLA. STAT. § 443.03(5)(c) (1975).
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the Florida Statutes (1975). "Charitable institutions" are defined
under both statutes as: "Only nonprofit corporations operating
physical facilities in [Florida] at which are provided charitable
services, a reasonable percentage of which shall be without cost to
those unable to pay."97 The sales and use tax further stipulates that
the provisions authorizing the exemption shall be strictly defined,
limited, and applied." Again, no definition of "reasonable percen-
tage" is provided either by statute or administrative regulation.
This narrow definition indicates a legislative intent that to
qualify as charitable, an institution (including a hospital) must
provide free services to the poor. It is significant that the prior
occupational license tax exemption statute, which was repealed,
defined "charitable purpose" as:
[T]he activities of a person, individual, corporation or organiza-
tion conducted for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons
to bring them under the influence of education or religion, relieve
them from disease, suffering or constraint, assist them in estab-
lishing themselves in life, or to erect or maintain public works. 9
No reference was made to the provision of free services to the poor.
The same law which repealed this broad definition of"charitable" '
also created the current statute, which contains the narrow defini-
tion of "charitable" requiring the provision of free services to the
poor. No reference is made to section 501 (c)(3) in either statute, and
thus the definition of "charitable" under the Florida Statutes
stands alone as the sole criterion for purposes of exemption from the
sales and use tax and the occupational license tax. There is no
apparent reason for the different treatment of these tax exemption
statutes by the legislature with respect to the incorporation by refer-
ence of section 501(c)(3).
An additional definition of "charitable" is contained in the
Charitable Funds Act.' Florida Statutes section 496.03(1) (1975),
a provision of the Charitable Funds Act, requires that:
Every charitable organization which intends to solicit contribu-
tions within this state, or have funds solicited on its behalf, shall,
97. FLA. STAT. § 205.022(7)(c) (1975).
98. FtA. STAT. § 212.08(7)(c) (1975).
99. Laws of Fla. ch. 67-433, § 1 (1967).
100. It was repealed by Laws of Fla. ch. 72-306, § 1 (1972).
101. FLA. STAT. ch. 496 (1975).
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prior to any solicitation, file a registration statement with the
Department of State upon forms prescribed by it.
"Charitable organization" is defined in Florida Statutes section
496.02(1)(a) (1975) as:
[A] group which is or holds itself out to be a benevolent, educa-
tional, voluntary health, philanthropic, humane, patriotic, reli-
gious or eleemosynary organization or any person who solicits or
obtains contributions solicited from the public for charitable pur-
poses ....
No specific mention is made of hospitals in this context. However,
pursuant to section 496.04(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975):
The following charitable organizations shall be exempt from the
registration fee provisions of this chapter:
(d) Any organization organized solely to operate a hospital li-
censed under Chapter 395.
One interpretation of this provision is that a hospital is per se a
charitable organization for purposes of the Charitable Funds Act. A
second interpretation is that if the hospital is a charitable organiza-
tion, it is exempt from the registration fee under the Act. When read
in conjunction with the definition of "charitable organization" in
section 496.02(1)(a), it appears that, in order to qualify as a "chari-
table organization," a hospital must be a "voluntary health" organi-
zation. However, no definition of "voluntary health" organization is
contained in the statute.
The foregoing examination of the varying definitions of "chari-
table institution" within the Florida Statutes reveals two major
underlying concepts. The first is that under certain statutes, any
corporation which qualifies as charitable under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code and which is therefore exempt from fed-
eral income taxation automatically qualifies as charitable for pur-
poses of exemption from state taxation, with no further require-
ments. This concept is reflected in Florida's ad valorem tax, in-
tangible personal property tax, corporate income tax, and
unemployment compensation law."°2
102. Only the ad valorem tax exemption is also available to institutions which are not
corporations. Such institutions must meet the definition of "charitable" contained in the
statute in order to qualify for exemption.
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Thus the legislature has, in effect, largely delegated its author-
ity to define "charitable" to the federal government for the pur-
poses of these statutes by adopting section 501 (c) (3) as the standard
to be used. Such delegation is constitutional since the legislature
has the power to approve and adopt the provisions of federal stat-
utes and all of the administrative rules made by a federal adminis-
trative body that are in existence and effect at the time the legisla-
ture acts.'"3 Revenue Ruling 69-545 was in existence and in effect at
the time section (c)(3) was adopted as the standard by the Florida
legislature, thus presenting no delegation problem.'"4
However, a state statute cannot adopt in advance a future and
unknown federal act or regulation.'"5 Therefore, future revenue rul-
ings under section 501(c)(3) will present a potential delegation prob-
lem. In addition, Florida Statutes section 220.03(3) (1975) of the
corporate income tax code appears to be unconstitutional at pres-
ent:
On or after January 1, 1972, when expressly authorized by law,
any amendment to the Internal Revenue Code shall be given
effect under this code in such manner and for such periods as are
prescribed in the Internal Revenue Code, to the same extent as
if such amendment had been adopted by the legislature of this
state.
No case has challenged the constitutionality of this statute as yet.
The second concept which emerges is that in order to qualify
as a charitable institution and thereby be exempt from taxation, a
corporation must provide free services to "those unable to pay."
This is the clear mandate of both the sales and use tax and the
occupational license tax.
The existence within the Florida statutory tax scheme of these
two divergent concepts of the definition of "charitable" results in
103. Florida Indus. Comm. v. State ex rel. Orange State Oil Co., 21 So. 2d 599 (Fla.
1945).
104. The Florida Supreme Court recently upheld a similar delegation under the "Little
FTC" Act (see note 90 supra) as constitutional, stating that requirements in the law as to
following federal decisions under the FTC Act apply only to decisions in effect when the
Florida Act was adopted. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, S.C.No. 47,502 (Feb. 25,
1976).
105. Presbyterian Homes of the Synod v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974); State v.
Camil, 279 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1973); Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1972); Florida Indus.
Comm. v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 10 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 1942); Hutchins v. Mayo, 197 So. 495
(Fla. 1940).
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the imposition of separate obligations upon tax exempt hospitals.
Those hospitals which are tax exempt based solely on their section
501(c)(3) status have concomitant obligations which are defined
under the Internal Revenue Code. 06 Those hospitals which are tax
exempt based solely upon the Florida definition of charitable have
the specific obligation to provide a reasonable percentage of their
services without cost to "those unable to pay." And those hospitals
which have tax exemptions under both concepts would appear to
have dual obligations, those under section 501(c)(3) as well as the
provision of a reasonable percentage of services without cost to
"those unable to pay." This lack of uniformity creates some confu-
sion, both in the state's administration and enforcement of the tax
exemptions under these statutes and in the hospitals' understand-
ing and fulfillment of their obligations arising from their tax exempt
status.
Legislative concern for provision of medical services to the poor
is not evidenced solely in Florida's tax exemption statutes. Florida
Statutes section 401.45(1) (1975) specifically requires the provision
of emergency care to all persons needing it:
No person shall be denied treatment for any emergency medical
condition which will deteriorate from a failure to provide such
treatment at any hospital licensed under Chapter 395 that oper-
ates an emergency department providing emergency treatment to
the public.
Thus, the poor have a statutory right to access to emergency care
in Florida. The hospital's duty to provide such care is enforced by
the imposition of sanctions under Florida Statutes section 401.41(1)
(1975), which provides that a violation of section 401.45 (1) is a
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding 60 days and/or a fine of $500.00.1"1 The emergency care
statute was enacted in 1973.
It is significant that, also in 1973, the chapter of the Florida
Statutes entitled "Hospital Service for the Indigent" was re-
pealed.' "' This chapter provided for extensive hospital services for
the "medically indigent," defined as "a person in this state who is
106. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
107. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082- .083 (1975).
108. The Florida Legislature passed Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-333, § 111, repealing FLA.
STAT. §§ 401 et seq. (1972).
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unable to provide himself with necessary services incident to illness,
injury, or disability as prescribed and ordered by a physician."" 9
This program was supported by state and county funds. There is no
legislative history to explain why this chapter was repealed, but it
is possible that the financial burden on the state and the counties
was too great to continue the program. Thus, the legislature im-
posed upon the hospitals the duty to treat all emergency patients
under section 401.45(1). Possibly the legislature believed that this
new duty, in conjunction with the existing duty of hospitals to treat
the poor pursuant to the various charitable tax exemption statutes,
would fill the vacuum created by the repeal of the chapter and
adequately provide for medical services for the poor.
The legislature's failure to include within the tax-exemption
statutes clear and definite standards to be applied in determining
whether or not an institution meets the definition of charitable for
purposes of tax exemption has forced the courts, in determining the
tax exempt status of institutions seeking such status, to proceed on
an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless, a definition of charitable has emerged
from these judicial interpretations of the tax exemption statutes
and the Florida Constitution." ' This definition requires tax exempt
hospitals to provide free medical services to the poor.
It is the general rule that all privately owned property is subject
to taxation "for the support and efficiency of the government from
which the property receives protection.""' Exemptions from taxa-
tion are the exception to this rule, and
are granted by the sovereign only when and to the extent that it
may be deemed to conserve the general welfare. Organic and
statutory exemptions, being in the nature of special privileges or
immunities, should be strictly construed in order to confine the
exemption within the limitations prescribed by the sovereign
power; otherwise the lawmaking intent and purpose may be frus-
trated to the detriment of the public welfare.'
109. Law of June 22, 1961, ch. 61-418, § 2 [1961], Fla. Laws 915 (repealed 1973).
110. The fact that these judicial interpretations have focused primarily upon the ad
valorem tax exemption and the Constitution of 1885 neither detracts from the validity of the
resulting definition of charitable nor precludes the applicability of that definition to the other
tax exemptions.
111. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 727-28, 192 So. 211, 215 (1939); Lum-
mus v. Florida-Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 821, 168 So. 232, 237 (1936).
112. Lummus v. Florida-Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 821-22, 168 So. 232, 237
(1936) (emphasis added), citing Amos v. Jacksonville Realty & Mortgage Co., 77 Fla. 403, 81
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A principal reason for the rule of strict construction of tax ex-
emption laws is the effect of tax exemptions upon the public inter-
est." ' To freely allow tax exemptions would place an unjust propor-
tion of the tax burden upon nonexempt property,"' and inevitably
result in the depletion of the sources of revenue from taxation." '
Accordingly, the pragmatic question of whether the public interest
is advanced or retarded by the granting of tax exemptions has been
of prime concern to the courts in determining whether or not the
legal concept of "a charitable institution entitled to exemption" is
fulfilled.
The question which logically arises is whether the public inter-
est is best served by not granting charitable tax exemptions to non-
profit hospitals per se, but rather by granting such exemptions only
upon the condition that free services be provided to the poor. Man-
datory provision of medical care to the poor by private, tax exempt
hospitals would compensate the State to some degree for its loss of
tax revenue since the effect of such a requirement would be to par-
tially relieve the burden of the public hospitals, Il' which are clearly
inadequate to meet the demands of the poor. Thus the public inter-
est would be advanced. On the other hand, merely granting exemp-
tions to hospitals with no such concomitant service obligation re-
sults in State support of private hospitals which deny access to the
So. 524 (1919) and Rast v. Hulvey, 77 Fla. 74, 80 So. 750 (1919); accord, Orange County v.
Orlando Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 66 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1953); Lummus v. Cushman, 41 So. 2d
895 (Fla. 1949); State ex rel. Miller v. Doss, 146 Fla. 852, 2 So. 2d 303 (1941); Miami
Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist
Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965); [1951-
19521 FLA. AT-r'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 278; [1945-1946] FLA. Arr'v GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 276.
113. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 180 n.4 (Fla. 2d
Dist.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965).
114. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 728, 192 So. 211, 216 (1939); Haines
v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 185 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 183
So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965).
115. Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821, 824 n.4 (Fla. 1968); Lummus v.
Florida-Adirondack School, Inc., 123 Fla. 810, 827, 168 So. 232, 239 (1936). In Haines v. St.
Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 180 n.4 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 183
So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965) the court took judicial notice of the comments of informed lay persons
as to the "whittling away" of the state's tax base:
Florida cannot reach its potential if the tax load is continually piled on fewer and
fewer non-exempt properties, but . . . the load would not be excessive if each
property bore its fair share of the costs of government.
116. Exemptions are often granted to charities on the ground that they render aid and




poor, accompanied by loss of tax revenues with which to support
public hospitals which do serve the poor. This certainly does not
advance the public interest since it is, in effect, a public subsidiza-
tion of private hospitals.
An affirmative answer to this question is further supported by
the public policy of the tax exemption laws:
The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of
charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred upon the
public by them, and the consequent relief, to some extent, of the
burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its
citizens.'7
A charitable tax exemption therefore requires that the public re-
ceive a benefit from, and the state be relieved of a burden by, the
recipient of the exemption. The fulfillment of this "benefit-burden"
concept by a private hospital receiving a charitable tax exemption
would be most advantageous to the public interest if manifested by
the provision of free services to the poor, and not merely by the
provision of health care to the paying general public.
In those cases requiring judicial interpretation of the constitu-
tional concept of charitable for purposes of tax exemption, the Flor-
ida courts, in applying a limited definition of this concept, have
focused on the provision of services to the poor."' One court has, in
fact, specifically rejected as a ground for tax exemption the broader
concept of charity as relief extended to the rich as well as the poor,"9
117. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 733, 192 So. 211, 217 (1939); Haines
v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 181 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied,
183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965). See also Dr. William Howard Hay Foundation, Inc. v. Wilcox,
156 Fla. 704, 705, 24 So. 2d 237, 238 (1945) where the court stated: "Exemption of property
from taxation is not a favor bestowed for the asking. It is reward offered to the owner who
used his property in such a way that material benefits flow to the public." Furthermore, an
analogy to the rationale for the tax exemption of institutions serving an educational purpose
is appropriate. As public schools were found to be inadequate to furnish all the required
educational facilities, it was deemed expedient to encourage the establishment and mainte-
nance of private schools. Tax exemption was considered a fair means to accomplish this.
Lummus v. Florida-Adirondack School, Inc., 23 Fla. 810, 827, 168 So. 232, 239 (1936).
118. Jasper v. Mease Manor, Inc., 208 So. 2d 821, 825 (Fla. 1968), citing Presbyterian
Homes of the Synod v. City of Bradenton, 190 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1966); Hungerford Convales-
cent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1963); Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist
Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965). In addition,
the Attorney General has defined charitable purpose in terms of aid and assistance to those
unable to procure adequate assistance with their own means. [1951-1952] FLA. Arr'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 278.
119. See Fredericka Home for the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal. 2d 789, 221 P.2d
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stating that such a concept was not "consistent with the tenor of
Florida law as pronounced by our Florida courts."'' 0 The court in-
stead adopted the objective concept of charity as denoting gifts to
the poor.' The judicial definition of charitable thus supports the
thesis that the public interest is benefited most by requiring chari-
table institutions receiving tax exemptions to provide free services
to the poor. Indeed, this obligation has been specifically imposed
upon tax exempt hospitals22 by the courts. In all of the cases'23
involving the question of whether a particular hospital qualified as
a charitable institution, the exemption was granted based upon
close scrutiny of the specific facts and circumstances,' which in
each case revealed a policy of providing services to persons unable
to pay.
In Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 12 5 a hospital was held to be
charitable where all persons who applied for treatment received it
whether they were able to pay or not, and those persons who were
unable to pay the full amount of the fixed fees were charged in
proportion to their ability to pay. In Orange County v. Orlando
Osteopathic Hospital, Inc.,"' the court found a substantial charita-
68 (1950); Fifield Manor v. County of Los Angeles, 188 Cal. App. 2d 1, 10 Cal. Rptr. 242 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1961).
120. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 183 (Fla. 2d Dist.),
cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965). Concern for the provision of services to those unable
to pay in order to qualify as charitable is evident in Presbyterian Homes of the Synod v. City
of Bradenton, 190 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1966) (dissent).
121. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 181 (Fla. 2d Dist.),
cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965). The court rejected a loosely subjective concept of a
charitable institution with respect to tax exemption, stating: "[I]t would be an enlargement
of constitutional meaning presaging further inequity and deterioration of an ad valorem
system that could be redeemed only by ultimate reform through legislative channels." Id. at
181 n.6.
122. A blood bank must also provide services "without charge to indigents and those
unable to pay for same" in order to receive a charitable tax exemption. [1963-1964] FLA.
Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 25.
123. Hungerford Convalescent Hosp. Ass'n v. Osborn, 150 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1963); Orange
County v. Orlando Osteopathic Hosp., Inc., 66 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1953).
124. Miami Battlecreek v. Lummus, 140 Fla. 718, 192 So. 211 (1939). The facts and
circumstances, specifically that 24 percent of the hospital's patients were charity patients,
were the basis of an Attorney General opinion in favor of a charitable tax exemption for a
hospital. 11949-1950 FLA. Arr'y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 224.
125. 140 Fla. 718, 725, 192 So. 211, 214 (1939). Of all patients treated, 64 percent received
treatment as charity (without charge), and 12 percent paid only a portion of the prescribed
charge. Id. at 726, 192 So. at 215.
126. Orange County v. Orlando Osteophathic Hosp., Inc., 66 So. 2d 285, 288 (Fla. 1953).
Of the hospital's net revenue, 34.19 percent was devoted to charity patient treatment, not
[Vol. 31:127
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ble use based upon findings of fact that no patient was denied the
use of the facilities or services of the hospital because of inability
to pay, and that patients who were unable to pay were given treat-
ment and received the same care and attention as those who were
able to pay. /A substantial charitable use was also found in
Hungerford 9onvalescent Hospital Association v. Osborn,'7 where
a hospital had no requirements for admission other than the need
of services and the availability of a bed, and charged each patient
so admitted on the basis of ability to pay. Provision of free services
to the poor is thus a key criterion which the courts use to determine
qualification for tax exemption based upon charitable use.
Not only does entitlement to tax exemption require that the
charitable use of property by a hospital include the provision of free
services to the poor, but such use also must be more than minor or
incidental."' Hospitals are not exempt from taxation merely be-
cause, as an incident to their operation, they administer medical
services to charity patients:
Hospitals have been exempted where they can show a prime
obligation to care for those who otherwise would become charges
upon society. Conversely when the basic purpose is to administer
to those fr/om whom it derives income and who are not indigent
or public charges, a hospital has been held a non-exempt enter-
prise notwithstanding some charity patients may be cared for on
a non-obligatory basis.'
Thus, the courts have imposed a substantial requirement upon
hospitals in exchange for their charitable tax exempt status-they
must benefit the public by providing more than a token amount of
free services to the poor, thus partially relieving the burden of the
state. The dilemma is that, as is so often the case, the requirement
imposed by the courts is not enforced because of difficulties asso-
ciated with administrative implementation.
including outpatient charity.
127. 150 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. 1963).
128. Johnson v. Sparkman, 159 Fla. 276, 279, 31 So. 2d 863, 864 (1947); Haines v. St.
Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 183 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 183 So.
2d 211 (Fla. 1965); cf. State v. Town of N. Miami, 59 So. 2d 779, 784-85 (Fla. 1952).
129. Haines v. St. Petersburg Methodist Home, Inc., 173 So. 2d 176, 183-84 n.9 (Fla. 2d
Dist.), cert. denied, 183 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1965).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the Florida tax exemption statutes and relevant
case law demonstrates that hospitals with charitable tax exemp-
tions must provide free services to the poor. Despite the existence
of this mandate, these laws are not an effective source of free service
to the poor because of a lack of administrative enforcement, statu-
tory ambiguity, and an absence of rules or regulations specifically
defining the obligation.
The use of "reasonable percentage" as the statutory standard
for the receipt of tax exemption creates an obvious ambiguity. No
definition of "reasonable percentage" is contained in the statute,
nor in any administrative rules or regulations. The promulgation of
rules and regulations containing specific criteria defining "reasona-
ble percentage," or amendment of the statute to include such cri-
teria, would easily remedy this problem. This approach. was fol-
lowed under the Hill-Burton Act through the adoption of presump-
tive compliance guidelines. 3 ' This author would propose the stan-
dard of 5 percent of operating costs, minus Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursements, as a "reasonable percentage."''
The use of the overbroad phrase, "those unable to pay," is a
similar problem with respect to eligibility for free care. No rules or
regulations or statutory criteria define "those unable to pay." With-
out further definition, this standard is impracticable to apply.
Again, the promulgation of rules or regulations containing specific
eligibility criteria, or amendment of the statute to include such
criteria, would eliminate the problem. The Hill-Burton Act may
serve as a model for reform once again. Pursuant to federal regula-
tions, "the state agency shall set forth in its state plan, subject to
approval by the Secretary [of HEW], criteria for identifying per-
sons unable to pay for services . ... "I3 Thus, specific criteria de-
fining persons entitled to free services under Hill-Burton must be
130. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text. Although substantively insufficient,
the fact that some guidelines have been promulgated is commendable.
131. Five percent has been suggested by the National Health Law Program (NHELP),
a program specifically devoted to health care concerns of the poor. Schwartz, Expanding the
Quantity of Medical Services Available to the Poor: Suing "Private" Hospitals Under the
Internal Revenue Code, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 587 (1974). This figure is also supported by
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 501(c)(3). Rose, Federal Regulation,
supra note 32, at 186 n.105.
132. 42 C.F.R. § 53.111(g) (1974).
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established by the states. Similarly, the adoption of income guide-
lines defining "those unable to pay" under Florida law would make
this standard workable. It is suggested that such income guidelines
should include the "medically indigent," as well as the "indigent"
in the traditional sense, 3' so that the impact of the provision of free
services would be broad enough to meet the existing need for health
care.
Beyond the lack of clarity in the statutory language, the incor-
poration by reference of the definition of "charitable" under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code presents serious problems.
First, the hospitals receive both federal and state tax exemptions
"for the price of one." In addition, assuming that no delegation
problem exists,'34 reliance upon section 501(c)(3) creates instability
with respect to the obligations of hospitals with charitable tax ex-
emptions under Florida law. Any change in the requirements of
section 501(c)(3), either by a revenue ruling or judicial interpreta-
tion, effects a corresponding change in the obligations of hospitals
exempt under Florida law. Thus, these obligations are in a state of
flux, as evidenced by the uncertainty created by Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon.'35
Furthermore, a revision of the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
which is inconsistent with the intent of the Florida Legislature and
Constitution-that charitable tax exempt institutions provide a
reasonable percentage of free care to those unable to pay-is possi-
ble, as evidenced by Revenue Ruling 69-545 which eliminates this
requirement of free care under section 501(c)(3). It is conceivable as
well that the implications of such a change could go unnoticed by
the Florida Legislature, thus frustrating the purpose of charitable
tax exemptions under Florida law. For example, Revenue Ruling 69-
545, which changed the requirements of section 501(c)(3), became
effective in 1969. Subsequent thereto, several of the Florida tax
exemption statutes were amended, with no change as to reliance
upon section 501(c)(3). It is not clear, however, whether the legisla-
ture either considered the impact of Revenue Ruling 69-545 upon
the Florida tax exemption statutes or was even aware of the new
ruling and its effect upon the requirements of section 501(c)(3).
133. See note 3 supra.
134. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
135. 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated and
remanded, 44 U.S.L.W. 4724 (U.S. June 1, 1976).
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Thus, the wisdom of reliance upon section 501(c)(3) is highly ques-
tionable.
The absence of enforcement of the obligation to provide free
services to the poor is by far the most serious problem. This is
evidenced by the private hospitals' undisputed practice of "dump-
ing" patients on the public hospitals and refusing to admit or treat
persons without the payment of a preadmission deposit.'36
In addition, the administration of the sales and use tax is typi-
cal of the State's indifference to the tax exempt hospitals' obligation
to provide free services to the poor. The focal point for the initial
application of this tax is the hospital's nonprofit status. No inquiry
is made as to the provision of free services to the poor.'37 In addition,
there is no subsequent monitoring of the hospital's compliance with
its obligation to serve the poor once the exemption is granted unless
a specific complaint is made against the hospital.' 8 If a complaint
is made, the inquiry made by the sales and use tax department is
superficial at best.' 3
Thus, as a practical matter the free care obligation of tax ex-
empt "charitable" hospitals is virtually meaningless to the poor.
Furthermore, the State is being deprived of desperately needed tax
revenues as a result of "charitable" tax exemptions for hospitals.
For example, the State's biggest and most consistent source of in-
come, the sales and use tax, fell $1.3 million short of estimates for
March 1976.140 The sales and use tax exemption of one Dade County
hospital alone represents approximately $50,000.00 per year,' and
there were 26 Dade County hospitals receiving sales and use tax
exemptions in 1975.1" Thus, the State cannot realistically afford to
136. Miami Herald, Jan. 15, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 3; Miami Herald, Jan. 17, 1975, § B, at
2, col. 4; Miami Herald, Aug. 20, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 1.
137. Application for Consumer Certificate of Exemption, Florida Sales and Use Tax,
Department of Revenue, State of Florida.
138. Answer to Interrogatory #8 of Plaintiff's 1st Set of Interrogatories to Defendant
Hansen, Silva v. Baptist Hospital, No. 75-6736.
139. Answer to Plaintiff's Request for Production of Documents to Defendant Hansen,
Silva v. Baptist Hospital, No. 75-6736.
140. Miami Herald, April 13, 1976, § B, at 2, col. 5. It should be noted that the Sales
and Use Tax represented $106.6 million of the total tax collection of $174.1 million for March,
1976.
141. HILL-BURTON COMPLIANCE REPORT of an unnamed hospital for Fiscal Year 1974.
142. Letter from L. Smithling, Exemption Examiner, Sales Tax Bureau, Department of
Revenue, State of Florida.
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continue to lose tax revenues from "charitable" hospitals without
receiving a quid pro quo.
At present, the hospitals are the only recipients of any benefit
conferred by the charitable tax exemptions. Moreover, this benefit
results in an increased burden on the State, without mitigating the
health care problems of the poor. This clearly was not the intended
result of either the Florida Constitution or Legislature in permitting
charitable tax exemptions. Enforcement of the obligations of tax
exempt hospitals is necessary if this situation is to be remedied.
